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ABSTRACT: This paper seeks to show that Charles Sanders Peirce's interest in an evolutionary 
account of the laws of nature is motivated both by his desire to extend the scope of the application 
of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) and by his attempt to explain the success of our 
deployment of the PSR, which presupposes the existence of determinate causal structures. One 
can situate Peirce's concern with the explanation of the laws of nature in relation to the influences 
of Naturphilosophie on Peirce. I then show that some strands of contemporary physics can be 
understood as resurrections of Peirce's evolutionary cosmology. I show that we can understand 
Lee Smolin's theory of “cosmological natural selection” as a version of Peirce's evolutionary 
cosmology that is characterized by greater refinement and determinacy. However I argue that, 
contrary to Smolin's claim, an evolutionary account of the laws of nature need not require the 
abandonment of the relativity of simultaneity as established by the special theory of relativity. I 
also argue that Lee Smolin and Roberto Unger's characterization of the “original state” in their 
account of evolutionary cosmology raises philosophical problems of individuation that are best 
approached from the perspective of Chinese process metaphysics. Finally I turn to the wider 
consequences of evolutionary cosmology in relation to how we traditionally “rank” fields of 
knowledge that deal with atemporal structures as “more rigorous” than fields that deal with 
historical phenomena. 
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The first part of this paper will discuss Peirce's evolutionary cosmology, which is 
centered around the thesis that the laws of nature evolve, and his motivations for 
 
1 I wish to acknowledge the helpful suggestions which were made by Richard T.W. Arthur in relation to 
this manuscript.  
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it. The second part of this paper will discuss the contemporary resurrection, by 
Lee Smolin and Roberto Unger, of Peirce's thesis. The discussion will revolve 
around the philosophical implications of this thesis, especially with regard to the 
need to rethink the nature of causation in order to make sense of this thesis, and 
the need to recognize (and perhaps abandon) the metaphorical nature of the way 
that we talk about laws as being "obeyed" by systems, or as "governing" systems. 
I will be focusing on three aspects of this evolutionary (and revolutionary) 
approach to the laws of nature. First, the idea (advanced explicitly by Smolin and 
Unger) that causal relations and processes are primary and that laws, understood 
as representations of a special case of causation taking the form of repetition and 
having a determinate structure, are derivative. I will argue that this approach, 
which purports to provide an account of causation in terms of powers and 
dispositions, runs into difficulties about the identity of the entities whose causal 
powers are taken to behave in a non-lawlike manner. I will then attempt to show 
how these difficulties can be mitigated by drawing on discourses of identity and 
individuation from early Chinese metaphysics. Second, I will engage with 
Smolin's claim that an evolutionary cosmology requires a preferred global time 
(Smolin 2013, 164). I will argue that the relativity of simultaneity does not preclude 
the existence of a determinate order of succession between causally related 
events, and hence, if a preferred global time is being introduced in order to guarantee 
the existence of a determinate order of succession between causally related 
universes (i.e., a *parent universe* and its progeny) then it is superfluous 
(assuming that we can independently establish that the universes in question are 
causally related). Third, I will argue that emphasizing the primacy of becoming 
over being has wider implications for the axiology of the sciences, i.e., the way in 
which we traditionally rank different sciences with physics at the top, then 
chemistry, then biology, then the human sciences on successively lower rungs. I 
think that the view that the more a certain field of knowledge deals with 
atemporal structures the more scientific it is, is quite prevalent. One can find it 
in structural movements in anthropology (attempts to dehistoricize its subject 
matter, as if the fact that the structures that it deals with are subject to change is 
something that tells against its scientific status), as well as in attempts to render 
Marxism scientific by Louis Althusser by emphasizing structure over history.2 I 
 
2 Here is Carl E. Schorske's characterization of this development: "somewhere about the 1950s, the break 
with history acquired the force of a generalized paradigm shift in academic culture. One discipline after the 
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will argue (in agreement with Smolin and Unger) that this view is both harmful 
and unjustified.3 
C.S. Peirce in his Design and Chance (1883-1884) claims that "among the things 
that demand explanation, then, are the laws of physics; and not this law or that 
law only but every single law" (Pierce 1989, 547).4 Hence, for Peirce, the primary 
motivation for postulating that the laws of physics evolve is that without 
postulating their evolution, and the existence of determinate selection 
mechanisms, we would be unable to explain why the laws of physics are as they 
are and not in any other way. The same mode of reasoning applies to initial 
conditions. In fact, Peirce and Smolin both seem to think that at the level of 
cosmology the distinction between initial conditions and physical laws is eroded. 
The motivation for postulating that the laws of physics evolve is derived from a 
desire to extend the range of cases to which the principle of sufficient reason 
(PSR) applies. Lee Smolin in his Time Reborn explicitly invokes Leibniz's PSR 
(Smolin 2013, 117), and C.S. Peirce talks of the "postulate that things shall be 
explicable" (Peirce 1989, 548). Note that it is important to distinguish the fact of 
evolution, taken here to simply mean change over a period of time, from its 
explanation by the postulation of determinate selection mechanisms (e.g., natural 
selection). The point is that if the evolution of physical laws is postulated in order 
to explain why our universe is governed by these laws and not others, then we 
have to be able to explain the outcome of the process of evolution by referring to 
determinate selection mechanisms.  
Peirce himself thought that his contemporaries had not fully exploited the 
 
other in the human sciences cut its ties to history......while the social sciences gravitated toward scientific 
abstraction (mathematical economics, quantification and behaviourism in sociology and politics and so on), 
the humanities de-contextualized their inquiry and treated their objects wholly internalistically" (Schorske 
1990, 416). We should note that in both cases the emphasis on atemporal structures in opposition to temporal 
(and changing) configurations is apparent. I should also note that while dehistoricization in anthropology is 
often associated with Claude-Levi Strauss' structuralism, George W. Stocking argues that the dehistoricizing 
tendency was firmly established in 20th century anthropology after the publication of Malinowski's Argonauts 
of the Western Pacific in 1922 (Stocking 1992, 274). For a critical discussion (from a Marxist perspective) of 
Althusser's structural version of Marxism I refer the reader to Alfred Schmidt's History and Structure (1983).  
3 Smolin briefly discusses the implications of his thesis for economics, emphasizing the importance of 
recognizing the path dependence of processes (Smolin 2013, 258-263). Unger also discusses the wider 
implications of the thesis that the laws of nature evolve, paying special attention to the social sciences (Unger 
and Smolin 2015, 67-74).  
4 This was Peirce's first attempt at developing his evolutionary cosmology.   
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explanatory power of evolutionary theories.5 According to him, their theories "all 
suppose essentially the same basis of physical law to have been operative in every 
age of the universe" (Peirce 1989, 548). Peirce thought that in order to explain 
why the universe has come to be governed by determinate laws we have to 
suppose that, in the distant past, physical laws were less determinate and perhaps 
nonexistent (i.e., causal relations were in some sense looser). In Design and Chance, 
Peirce also mentions an interesting idea. Pierce argues that in order to explain 
the PSR itself (taken as a metaphysical principle, or even as a heuristic whose 
evident success depends on the world being a certain way, or having a 
determinate causal structure), we have to postulate that it (i.e., the PSR) emerged 
(or that the corresponding state of the world emerged) over a long period of time, 
so that initially the PSR did not hold, and that indeterminacy (in the metaphysical 
sense) reigned in the universe (Peirce 1989, 548). In short, Peirce suggests that in 
order to explain how the PSR holds in the world we have to assume that it did 
not always hold.6 Perhaps a Leibnizian objection to Peirce's conception of the 
PSR would take the form of maintaining that the PSR is not a natural law at all, 
but only a meta-principle, i.e., a principle that governs all normative discourse 
for reason asking and reason giving animals such as ourselves.7 I think that a 
charitable reading of Peirce would read him as demanding that we provide an 
explanation for the evident success of our explanatory activities. For I take it that 
Peirce is really claiming that for our explanatory activities to be successful, which 
by and large they are, the universe that we inhabit must be a certain way. In 
particular, I take Peirce to be claiming that since much of our explanatory activity 
takes the form of providing causal accounts, and since the explanatory power of 
these causal accounts is dependent on the universe having determinate causal 
structures, the demand to explain the success of the PSR is really a demand to 
explain the determinate causal structures that characterize our universe in its 
current stage (i.e., how did the determinate causal structures come to be? and 
 
5 I should note that Peirce makes explicit reference to Darwin, "the epoch of intellectual history at which 
the world is now arrived finds thought still strongly under the influence imparted to it in 1859 by Darwin's 
great work" (Peirce 1989, 544).  
6 As Peirce puts it, "among the determinate facts which ought thus to be explained is the very fact supposed 
in this postulate [i.e., the PSR]. This must also be explained, must be among the things which have been 
somehow brought about. How then can it be absolutely, rigidly & immoveably true?" (Peirce 1989, 548).  
7 This Leibnizian response was brought to my attention by Richard T.W. Arthur 
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why did these determinate causal structures emerge and not others?). I think it is 
also important to note that Peirce's emphasis on the metaphysical aspects of the 
PSR might be explained by what Andrew Reynolds has identified as Peirce's 
commitment to the research tradition of Naturphilosophie with its emphasis on the 
need to explain all manifestations of order, including the laws of nature 
themselves (Reynolds 2002, 3).8  
At this point in our discussion we should make explicit what evolution (on the 
Darwinian model) requires. First, it requires variations that can be passed on to 
progeny (in this case, subsequent universes, or subsequent states of the same 
universe). Second, it requires a selection mechanism (e.g., a struggle for existence) 
that determines or influences which variations get passed on (DeWitt 2010, 289). 
It seems that if the laws of nature evolve then there must be some point in time 
at which they are subject to violation (so that we can get the variations which are 
a necessary condition for evolution). Peirce ascribes this to absolute chance: "I 
suppose that on excessively rare sporadic occasions a law of nature is violated in 
some infinitesimal degree; that may be called absolute chance" (Peirce 1989, 549).9 
Note that Peirce is not referring to situations where there are epistemic obstacles 
that are preventing us from subsuming phenomena under physical laws; he is 
talking about situations where there is indeterminacy on a metaphysical or 
ontological level. We should also note that Peirce draws a distinction between 
"ordinary chance" (or "relative chance") which is explicable by reference to 
specific mathematical structures (i.e., the notion of chance as it is employed in 
statistics) and absolute chance which is absolute in so far as it is not explicable in 
principle (though it may itself play an explanatory role if it is integrated into a 
narrative or evolutionary account). So the distinction between the two kinds of 
 
8 Reynolds offers an interesting characterization of Peirce's metaphysics as "Hegelian dialectical idealism 
meets darwinian evolution and statistical thermodynamics [!]" (Reynolds 2002, 6).  
9 I should note that Peirce is thinking of chance in what he takes to be Aristotelian terms in the sense that 
chance, on his view, is an absence of cause: "chance in the Aristotelian sense, mere absence of cause" (Pierce 
1989, 547). In his entry on chance in the Century Dictionary he speaks of events coming about by chance 
"without any determining cause or principle whatever, by lawless, sporadic originality" (quoted from 
Reynolds 2002, 149). However, Peirce's characterization of this conception of chance as Aristotelian is 
misleading because chance for Aristotle is a cause (i.e., not a "mere absence of cause") even though (on 
Aristotle's view) events brought about by chance are inherently unpredictable (Dudley 2012, 27-30, 39). 
Hence, as Reynolds has noted, Peirce's characterization of Aristotle's conception of chance as the absence 
of cause is rather strange (Reynolds 2002, 149).  
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chance is not a distinction between subjective and objective chance, but rather a 
distinction between a kind of chance that can be understood in terms of laws, 
and one that cannot. When Peirce claims that "everybody is familiar with the fact 
that chance has laws, and that statistical results follow therefrom" (quoted from 
Reynolds 2002, 145), he is referring to the first kind of chance. Of course, Peirce 
does not make any references to quantum mechanics (which was developed after 
his death), but his views on chance do not preclude the possibility of there being 
non-deterministic laws, involving the first kind of chance (Reynolds 2002, 138).10 
Peirce draws a connection between the PSR and chance, "the hypothesis of 
absolute chance is part and parcel of the hypothesis that everything is explicable" 
(Peirce 1989, 549). We have to be careful in order to avoid contradiction (because 
I take it that absolute chance is not explicable); perhaps one way to think of this 
claim is that the price we have to pay for extending the domain of the explicable 
at the general or global level is the admission of sporadic indeterminacy at the 
micro-level (Peirce's absolute chance).11 Hence, strictly speaking, not everything is 
explicable because the sporadic violations of the laws would not be explicable (we 
would ascribe them to absolute chance), though they will figure as part of a narrative 
explanation for why our universe came to be governed by the laws that do govern 
it. Peirce seems to think that even laws that appear to be rigid (say the laws of 
mechanics for mid-sized objects) are in fact far less rigid than they appear to be, 
because they "repose upon others far less rigid themselves due to chance and so 
on in an infinite regress" (Pierce 1989, 551). Here, it appears to me that the regress 
can be taken in two directions. It can be taken as regress into the past (i.e., the 
further we go back in time, the more indeterminate the laws of nature become), 
or it can be taken as regress from the macro-level to the micro-level (and we treat 
the deterministic laws of the macro-level as being deterministic only because they 
are approximations).12 It appears to me that Peirce wants to emphasize both 
directions of the regress. I should also add that with respect to the second kind of 
regress, Peirce explicitly appeals to the derivation of Boyle's law and Charles' law 
from statistical probabilities. In his words, these two laws are "known to be results 
 
10 Burch (2014) notes that Peirce would not have been surprised by the results that have been obtained by 
measurements in quantum mechanics.  
11 Though, I should add that Peirce sometimes speaks of great deviations that occur extremely infrequently.  
12 I.e., on Peirce's account, even macro-level laws are not really deterministic.  
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of chance" (Peirce 1989, 551). Peirce does not seem to explicitly endorse a 
distinction in kind (or a qualitative distinction) between micro-level and macro-
level chance in so far as he is committed to the view that laws as such (including 
macro-level laws) are not deterministic (Reynolds 2002, 147).13 It seems that what 
Peirce wants to say when he talks of macro-level laws reposing on less rigid micro-
level laws is that the role of chance is more pronounced at the micro-level than 
at the macro-level, so the distinction seems to be one of degrees (Burch 2014). 
Note that Peirce, in so far as he thinks of chance as involving continually slight 
deviations from existing uniformities (as well as great deviations that occur 
extremely infrequently), still thinks that chance "can only work upon the basis of 
some law or uniformity" (Peirce 1989, 551).  Peirce goes on to claim that chance 
involves departures from established uniformities, and these departures produce 
even more determinate (or to use his term, "stricter") uniformities. I take it that 
here Peirce is talking about how absolute chance would operate in what we would 
now describe as a cooled-down universe, and this is no way contradictory to the 
supposition that the early universe lacked uniformities (in the sense of 
determinate causal structures). On my reading of Peirce's account, in a universe 
lacking determinate causal structures absolute chance would be the norm (so that 
we do not have to think of it as manifesting itself in terms of departures from 
established uniformities). Note that Peirce's attitude towards causality (and in 
particular his attitude towards accounts of causation in terms of powers and 
dispositions) seems to me be rather ambiguous. On the one hand (in other works) 
he makes disparaging remarks about "those who make causality one of the 
original uralt elements in the universe or one of the fundamental categories of 
thought" and he claims that he is not one of them (Peirce 1992, 197).14 Yet, on the 
other hand, it seems that Peirce still needs to employ an account of causality that 
treats causes as powers for he (as we shall see below) still wants to speak of 
tendencies, and it seems incoherent to speak of tendencies without presupposing 
causal powers.15  
 
13 Though, they do become more deterministic in character (or more rigid) as time goes on, due to the effects 
of habit (see below).  
14 Note that in this respect his view is different from Smolin and Unger's view on this issue.  
15 One possibility is that Peirce wants to argue that understanding causation in terms of powers and 
dispositions does not commit us to thinking that there are necessary connections between causes and their 
effects. So we can read him as implicitly claiming that causal connections are both real (in the sense that 
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Peirce advances a thesis about the role of habit, understood as the tendency to 
repeat any action which has been performed before (Peirce 1989, 553), in the formation of 
physical laws. In fact, Peirce claims that the laws of physics might just be habits 
(or the products of habits) acquired by systems. Note that this presupposes that 
there is already some tendency towards the formation of habits in at least some 
systems (hence the need for some kind of real power).16 It also implies that many 
events which we take to be independent (in the statistical sense) of one another, 
are in fact not independent (in this sense habit-taking, if it did take place, would 
undermine many statistical models that assume that the events in question are 
statistically independent of one another). The key issue is that we need something 
that acts as a selection pressure that affects which habits get passed on (I should 
also add that, in "Design and Chance", Peirce is not very clear on this issue). 
Peirce requires that selection should take place by the destruction of systems that 
form, or have a tendency to form "bad habits" (understood as habits that are not 
conducive to the survival of the system in question in a specific environment), but 
he does not really provide us with a determinate measure of relative fitness.   
Perhaps at this point the reader might wonder whether it would not make 
more sense for Peirce to just speak of regularities and drop all talk of laws. It might 
seem that this is an attractive position for Peirce to take, but, as I have noted 
above, he cannot coherently replace all talk of powers with talk of regularities 
because he still wants to speak of tendencies and for this he needs causal powers. 
As we will see shortly, Smolin and Unger do not want to drop all talk of laws, but 
they do wish to argue that laws are dependent on existing causal connections, 
and not the other way around. In other words, they wish to argue that laws only 
emerge when causal connections attain a structural form. I am personally more 
inclined towards Smolin and Unger's account of causation in terms of powers and 
dispositions, as the usual alternative (i.e., the Humean account of causation in 
terms of constant conjunction or regularities) runs into some severe difficulties. 
One of the most damaging objections against the Humean account of causation 
 
there are real powers and dispositions) and contingent (one could also argue that, on this reading, talk about 
"violations" of laws is really superfluous).  
16 We should also note that Peirce speaks explicitly of forces acting on bodies (Peirce 1992). So he does seem 
to think that there are active causal powers.  
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in terms of regularities is that it cannot distinguish between contingent and 
lawlike (or causally substantive) regularities (Chalmers 2013, 198-201). However, 
as we shall see, the powers and dispositions account of causation also leads to 
some difficulties for Smolin and Unger's account of the evolution of the laws of 
nature, but for now we will return to Peirce.17  
In some of his later papers, Peirce attempted to explain how the tendency 
towards the formation of habits could arise in the first place. In The Architecture of  
Theories (1890), he seems to adopt a form of Schelling's version of absolute 
idealism,18 "It [i.e., his evolutionary cosmology] would suppose that in the 
beginning – infinitely remote – there was a chaos of unpersonalized feeling....this 
feeling, sporting [i.e., varying] here and there in pure arbitrariness, would have 
started the germ of a generalizing tendency" (Peirce 2010, 110). In terms of 
whether we are justified in believing that the laws of physics cannot evolve, Peirce 
thinks that such a belief cannot be justified with reference to the available 
evidence. In The Doctrine of  Necessity Examined (1891), Peirce argues that the laws 
of physics are only approximations: "try to verify any law of nature and you will 
find that the more precise your observations, the more certain they will be to 
show irregular departures from the law" (Peirce 2010, 118). Furthermore, Peirce 
notes that, given enough time, the Second Law of Thermodynamics, in its 
(correct) statistical formulation, does not forbid the emergence of configurations 
that have low entropy (though, we should note that the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics does indeed predict that eventually this low entropy 
configuration will be replaced by high entropy configurations).19  
I think that it is important to note that if we think of physical laws as being 
contingent in character (as Peirce seems to do) then we may be able to side-step 
the Humean problem of induction (at least in some of its guises, in so far as it is 
 
17 To the extent that Peirce thinks of causation in terms of powers and dispositions, these difficulties also 
apply to his views (but, as I have noted above, his views on causation seem ambiguous to me, so I will be 
focusing on Smolin and Unger's account when discussing these difficulties).  
18 The connection between Peirce's view and Schelling's version of absolute Idealism is made explicit by 
Peirce himself in The Law of Mind (1892): "I have begun by showing that tychism must give birth to an 
evolutionary cosmology, in which all the regularities of nature and mind are regarded as products of growth, 
and to a Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened 
mind" (Peirce 2010, 135). For an extensive discussion of why Peirce associated his evolutionary cosmology 
with Schelling's idealism rather than Hegel's see Paul Franks (2015).  
19 Lee Smolin makes a similar point (Smolin 2013, 199-202).  
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often presented as a challenge to the physical sciences' account of nature in terms 
of necessary laws).20 For example, Kant took Hume's problem of induction to 
constitute a challenge to Newton's mechanics, precisely because it undermined 
the epistemic warrant for attributing necessity to Newton's three laws of motion. 
This was the primary motivation behind Kant's attempt at deriving the three laws 
of motion, in his Metaphysical Foundations of  Natural Science (1786), in such a way so 
as to demonstrate their necessity.21 If we cease to regard the laws of physics as 
being necessary, then we can attenuate the worries that motivated Kant's 
attempted derivation.22 Perhaps one way to understand this development is to say 
that evolutionary cosmology (or a historical approach to cosmology) transforms 
an epistemological problem about the impossibility of providing an epistemic 
warrant for the characterization of the laws that science discovers as being 
necessary in character (i.e., as discovering necessary causal connections) into an 
ontological or metaphysical insight about the character of the laws themselves 
(i.e., that they are contingent).  
Peirce insists that variety (in general) is something that requires explanation. 
On his view, it is permissible for single events to be unintelligible, but generality 
(and uniformity) must be explained. But what exactly is the role of chance in 
Peirce's cosmological theory? Peirce clearly recognizes that chance, on its own, 
does not have sufficient explanatory power: "to undertake to account for 
anything by saying baldly that it is due to chance would, indeed, be futile. But 
this I do not do. I make use of chance chiefly to make room for a principle of 
generalization, or tendency to form habits, which I hold has produced all 
regularities" (Peirce 2010, 124). Hence, chance, coupled with a tendency to form 
habits (as well as determinate selection mechanisms, which Peirce is admittedly 
rather unclear about), is introduced in order to account for how heterogeneity 
 
20 I should note that not all proponents of evolutionary cosmology seem to take this approach. For instance, 
Roberto Unger thinks that the invocation of the concept of contingency, "betrays bad faith or confusion: a 
surreptitious genuflection to rationalist metaphysics by those who pride themselves on having cast off its 
shackles" (Unger and Smolin 2015, 45).   
21 Kant thought that the concept of laws of nature implies necessity: "the word nature already carries with 
it the concept of laws, and the latter carries with it the concept of the necessity of all determinations of a 
thing belonging to its existence" (Kant 2004, 4).  
22 Peirce, unlike Kant, was perfectly content with the idea that nature can change in fundamental ways. As 
Burch (2014) has noted, this implies that Peirce was a fallibilist about scientific knowledge in general.  
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can arise from homogeneity over a long period of time, and to account for the 
specific forms of complexity that have arisen.23 On Peirce's view, it is the tendency 
to form habits that ensures that the laws of nature will become more rigid as time 
goes on. The important thing to note here is that this mode of explanation is a 
kind of historical (or narrative) explanation. I will not deal here with the 
objections that have been raised against the thesis that historical or narrative 
explanations can constitute an adequate mode of explanation (for a science) 
simply because these objections (especially the objection that all explanations 
must take the form of "covering laws") have historically been associated with 
positivism, and have lost much of their appeal with the decline of positivism (Roth 
1988). Furthermore, as Marie I. Kaiser and Daniel Plenge have pointed out, 
historical/narrative explanations are central to fields whose scientific credentials 
are well established: geology, palaeontology, and evolutionary biology (Kaiser 
and Plenge 2014, 3). At any rate, it is not at all obvious that the introduction of 
historical accounts in physics would diminish its scientific status.  
We now turn to the views of Lee Smolin (and to some extent, to the views of 
Roberto Unger), who refines and extends Peirce's theory. Smolin calls his account 
of evolutionary cosmology "cosmological natural selection". Smolin's key claim 
is that "universes reproduce by the creation of new universes inside black holes. 
Our universe is thus a descendant of another universe, born in one of its black 
holes, and every black hole in our universe is the seed of a new universe" (Smolin 
2013, 124). Note that on Smolin's account these multiple universes are (or have 
been at some point in time) causally connected with one another (which is not 
the case for the multiple universes in so called "multiverse models"). As I have 
noted above, evolution requires two factors: first, variations that can be passed 
on to progeny, these are, on Smolin's account, the parameters of the Standard 
Model of Particle Physics (i.e., the masses of the elementary particles and the 
strengths of the four basic forces),24 and the variation takes place each time a new 
universe is born in a black hole.25 Second, we require a determinate selection 
mechanism and/or a measure of relative fitness. We should note that Smolin 
 
23 For empirical evidence that supports Peirce's claims see Dearmont (1995).  
24 These are: gravitation, electromagnetic force, the strong nuclear, and weak nuclear forces.  
25 Note that the claim that black holes give birth to new universes is presented as a consequence of the 
hypothesis that quantum gravity eliminates singularities. 
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specifies the selection mechanism by specifying a measure of relative fitness. 
According to him, "the fitness of a universe is then a measure of how many black 
holes it spawns. The number turns out to depend sensitively on the 
parameters"(Smolin 2013, 125), e.g., if in one of the many black holes that are in 
our universe, a universe is born with parameters that do not allow for the 
formation of black holes, then that universe will not have descendants. 
Furthermore, on this account, our universe is actually a fairly typical universe. 
This is the case because only universes that have parameters that are conducive 
to high fertility will have progeny (and over a long period of time, the population 
of descendant universes will come to have similar parameters. I take it that the 
assumption here is that the population has reached a local peak in terms of 
relative fitness). Also, note that the configurations of the parameters that give rise 
to black holes also give rise to a universe that is conducive to life (because it would 
contain the carbon and oxygen that are needed for the emergence of life). We 
should briefly note that, if this account is correct, then the fine tuning argument 
is completely undermined. Also note that we are not forced to invoke the 
anthropic principle, which attempts to explain why our universe has the 
parameters that it has by claiming that we can only exist in a universe that has 
parameters that are conducive to life. However, I think that the manner in which 
these parameters can be inherited is rather unclear. It seems to me that they can 
only be inherited if concrete entities, having the causal powers that determine 
these parameters, can somehow pass from one universe to the other (and hence 
carry the causal powers that give rise to the specific parameters and laws).  
Can we get falsifiable predictions out of this account (note that Smolin is very 
Popperian!)?26 Yes, one prediction is that "the most massive neutron stars cannot 
be heavier than a certain limit [around twice the mass of the sun]" (Smolin 2013, 
127). Another prediction is that we cannot get a universe that has more black 
holes than ours by making minor changes in the parameters of our own universe 
(this is a claim about relative fitness, so there could be large changes in the 
parameters that yield universes that have more black holes than our own). Smolin 
thinks that for his account to work, it must also lead to predictions about how 
many universes have certain characteristics at each moment in time. Smolin 
 
26 "If an idea is not vulnerable to falsification, it is not science" (Smolin 2013, 139).  
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therefore thinks that he needs a preferred global time to provide him with a notion 
of simultaneity across the whole population of universes. As Smolin himself 
recognizes, this would mean that the relativity of simultaneity, as established by 
special relativity, will have to be abandoned.27  
However, it seems to me that an evolutionary account of the laws of nature 
need not contradict the relativity of simultaneity. For if universe x gives rise to 
universe y, then the very fact that there is a causal connection between the two 
implies that there is a determinate order of succession with universe x preceding 
universe y (because the relativity of simultaneity, as laid out by the theory of 
special relativity, does not say anything about there not being a determinate order 
of succession between causally connected events). On the other hand, one could 
raise the objection that there could be no causal relation or connection that 
"passes" through a black hole because, at the singularity, there is a kind of rupture 
in space-time itself, so no causal connection can be said to take place across a 
black hole (i.e., the criticism would be that if we speak of a causal connection 
between two universes, we are using the word ‘causal’ in a very weak and 
metaphorical way).28 I think that one response to this objection would be to argue, 
as Unger wants to argue (but, as far as I know, he does not relate his argument to 
this particular objection) that strictly speaking there are no singularities.29 His 
point is that we should take Einstein's initial reaction to singularities at face value 
(i.e., that they indicate that there is a problem with the field equations of general 
relativity, so that singularities are a sign of failure under certain conditions). Unger 
himself is not aware of this but denying the possibility of singularities (involving 
actually infinite physical quantities) need not lead us to the rejection of actual 
infinities, if we adopt a Leibnizian account of infinity. On Leibniz's account there 
are indeed infinitely many things— for instance, on Leibniz's account, a body is 
comprised of an infinity of monads (Arthur 2014, 85). But this (qualified) 
 
27 "Here's the price of admission: it means giving up on the relativity of simultaneity and going back to a 
picture of the world in which an absolute definition of simultaneity holds throughout the universe" (Smolin 
2013, 156).  
28 As Tim Maudlin puts it, "the singularity is an edge of space-time itself, where time-like curves cannot be 
continued" (Maudlin 2012, 144).  
29 As Unger puts it, "The invocation of an eternal universe is no more defensible than the appeal to an initial 
singularity at the beginning our present universe. In both instances, a mathematical idea, with no 
counterpart in physical nature, is made to do service for missing insight" (Unger and Smolin 2015, 102).   
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admission of actual infinities does not imply that there are actually any infinite 
physical quantities in reality. At any rate, it is clear that this account of actual 
infinity does the work that Unger and Smolin require (i.e., it precludes the 
singularities which seem to offer an obstacle to the existence of causal relations 
between different universes across black holes), while not making any rash claims 
about the impossibility of there being an actual infinity of things in the universe 
(which is what Unger's blanket rejection of actual infinity would imply).  
Smolin also takes on board Peirce's idea that habit formation is the only 
unchanging law. He calls this the principle of  precedence (which he frames in 
reference to measurements, because he introduces it in relation to quantum 
mechanics), according to this principle "repeated measurements yield the same 
outcome" (Smolin 2013, 146). The point is that what we take to be instances where 
specific laws of physics are obeyed are to be explained by appealing to this 
principle, which still allows for new measurements to yield unpredictable results 
and genuine novelty. However, if we are formulating this principle in terms of 
measurements, then it seems to me that we would have a problem in terms of 
accounting for how a truly novel system can emerge without us. Hence, I take it 
that someone who holds that the laws of nature evolve does require something 
like Peirce's absolute chance and a general principle of habit formation. Moreover, 
as Smolin himself points out, it is important to answer such questions as "How 
does a system recognize all its precedents? By what mechanism does a system 
pick out a random element in the collection of its precedents?" (Smolin 2013, 
151).30 I take it that attempting to answer these questions was a motivating factor 
 
30 I should also note that Smolin and Unger recognize that the plausibility of their view hinges on a 
resolution to what they call the meta-law dilemma. The meta-law dilemma takes the following form: are 
there laws that govern the changes in laws (this seems to be required by the PSR)? If there are, then either 
those laws are in time and hence subject to change (on their view, everything that is in time is subject to 
change) and then we would have to appeal to meta-meta-laws and so on in an infinite regress, or they are 
timeless and do not change (but then we are back again at the problem of not being able to answer the 
question: why these meta-laws?). Unger points out that this dilemma can be avoided if we reject the key 
assumption upon which it is based, namely, the assumption that causal explanation has to be underwritten 
by appealing to laws of nature (Unger and Smolin 2015, 9). Unger and Smolin want to argue that laws 
depend on causal connections and not the other way around (i.e.,  that the recurrence of causal connections, 
by way of something analogous to Peirce's principle of habit formation, leads to the formation of lawlike 
causal structures). However, we might question the assumption that to be in time is to change, for being in 
time is also a presupposition for things that do not change (this point was brought to my attention by Richard 
Arthur). Hence, being subject to change is not the only possible mode of existing in time (note that this is 
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for Peirce's "Schelling-fashioned idealism", and if we regard this view as being 
metaphysically extravagant, then we need to come up with an alternative if we 
are interested in maintaining the thesis that the laws of nature evolve. Smolin 
claims that his approach will enable us to answer the question: why these initial 
conditions and why these laws? However, we should ask how far back? For it 
seems that we are faced with either an infinite regress of universes stretching into 
the past, or a brute fact about the initial conditions of an ancestor universe.31 
It is clear that lurking behind this discussion is the contentious status of 
scientific laws and their relation to laws of nature. Smolin himself does not 
distinguish between the two, but philosophers of science have sometimes tended 
to distinguish between a scientific law (understood as an approximate 
representation of the way that certain systems behave) and a law of nature, 
understood as "a fundamental feature of the universe that is responsible for the 
way the universe works" (DeWitt 2010, 184). Smolin, Unger, and Peirce are 
claiming that not only scientific laws evolve but that even laws of nature evolve. 
Smolin's point is that causal relations are the fundamental features of the universe 
(and not laws, understood as mathematical formulations), and that these relations 
evolve, hence the laws of nature (understood as emerging from interactions 
between different causal powers) also evolve. The proponents of cosmological 
natural selection may be interpreted as making a stronger claim than the claim 
that, in the distant past, the universe had a different structure than the one that 
it has in our current cooled-down universe. Unger explicitly claims that "the 
implication of the conception of the original state is that it had no structure at all" 
(Unger and Smolin 2015, 26). Both Unger and Smolin seem to think that we can 
employ the concept of causality without associating it with the repetition of 
phenomena in a specific order by understanding causation in terms of powers 
 
not meant to resolve the dilemma, it is only meant to show that their understanding of what it is to be static 
or unchanging is inadequate).  
31 Unger seems to think that this problem cannot be resolved. He calls this problem "the antinomy of 
cosmogenesis", and he thinks that the only thing we can do is to take it as "a sign not only of the limits to 
the powers of science and of its ally in natural philosophy but also of our groundlessness - our inability to 
grasp the ground of being or existence" (Unger and Smolin 2015, 102).  I should also add that while Peirce 
and Smolin accept the PSR, Unger rejects it; he thinks that at some point in our inquiry we will encounter 
sheer, inexplicable facticity.  
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and dispositions (i.e., constant conjunction is only one of the ways by which causal 
relations are made manifest, and this only takes place in our cooled down 
universe).32 What is fundamental on this view of causality is time, not laws. 
However, it seems questionable to claim that an account of causation in terms of 
powers and dispositions can support such a view. For if, as Unger claims, there 
was no structure at all in the early universe, then it follows that the causal powers 
and dispositions of the entities in question (the entities that existed in this "original 
state") were undergoing abrupt and incessant changes.33 Now, if entities are 
individuated by their powers and capacities (and I assume that Smolin and Unger 
would have to say that they are), then we have a situation where entities are 
changing their identities abruptly and entirely inexplicably (note that here we are 
talking about wholesale changes in their causal powers and not just incremental 
ones). This inability to track self-identical entities through time (because in a 
situation where entities are abruptly and inexplicably changing their causal 
powers and properties there are no self-identical entities over any extended 
period of time) becomes especially problematic when we consider that Smolin 
and Unger want to provide us with a historical account that explains why our 
universe has the laws and parameters that it has. For I take it that this historical 
account will have to make reference to self-identical entities that existed in this 
"original state" and then describe the selection mechanisms that operated on 
these self-identical entities that led to the reproduction of entities behaving in a 
certain way (and the destruction of entities behaving in ways that were not 
conducive to survival under the conditions that existed then). 
On the other hand, one could respond to this objection by claiming that it 
begs the question in so far as it presupposes that becoming must begin with being, 
i.e., with what is identical with itself. A serious advocate of the priority of 
becoming over being will hold that you can have causal activity without there 
being an underlying self-identical substance. I take it that by the "priority of 
becoming over being" Unger and Smolin mean to advocate for a view that is 
 
32 Arguably, Peirce holds a somewhat similar view (but I will not be explicitly discussing his account here, 
because, as I have noted above, Peirce's views on causation are rather ambiguous). 
33 I should note that Peirce also thought of the "original state" in similar terms: "the state of things in the 
infinite past is chaos. . . the nothingness of which consists in the total absence of regularity" (quoted from 
Potter 1996, 137).  
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close to the one that Socrates ascribes to Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Protagoras 
in Plato's Theatetus: "there is no single thing or quality, but out of motion and 
change and admixture all things are becoming relatively to one another, which 
'becoming' is by us incorrectly called being, but is really becoming, for nothing 
ever is, but all things are becoming" (quoted from Chenyang Li and Franklin 
Perkins 2015, 5). In fact, this seems to me to be an adequate description of what 
Unger has in mind when he talks about the "original state". I wish to suggest that 
one way in which Unger and Smolin could add philosophical depth to their 
account is to draw connections between their views (in particular their views 
about the possibility of causal processes without the existence of self-identical 
things over any significant period of time, at least in so far as this is presupposed 
in their conception of "the original state" of the universe) and early Chinese 
metaphysics which takes change and becoming as having ontological primacy 
over individuated and self-identical things. Unger and Smolin associate their 
views with what they take to be an undercurrent in the history of Western 
philosophy that has emphasized the priority of becoming over being.34 However, 
it seems to me that the problem which I have outlined above is precisely the sort 
of the problem that could be rendered more tractable if approached from the 
perspective of Chinese philosophical traditions. For, as Franklin Perkins (2015a) 
has noted, metaphysics in Chinese philosophical traditions has historically been 
centred around the problems that arise from adopting a basic framework that 
emphasizes holism and the constancy of change (these problems include problems 
about the status of individual entities, including the nature and presuppositions 
of individuation). Hence, it is to be expected that important insights into the 
resolution of this problem as well as access to a more adequate philosophical 
vocabulary for dealing with this problem can be attained by turning to Chinese 
philosophical traditions. 
The problem of self-identity (which we can also re-describe as a problem of 
individuation) that I have raised above might be resolved if we approach the 
problem of individuation from the perspective of Chinese process metaphysics, 
where to be an individuated thing (i.e., a wu) is just to have a specific appearance, 
 
34 They make explicit references to Heraclitus, Hegel, Bergson, and Whitehead (Unger and Smolin 2015, 
xv). 
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here we have an identification of the individual entity with its attributes without 
any reference to a substance which possesses these attributes (Perkins 2015b, 63).35 
So perhaps one way to get around the problem I have raised is to speak of things 
just as causal powers (and not as things possessing causal powers), and to simply 
accept that the narrative explanation will have to speak of things whose character 
as particular individuated things is ephemeral (and this is just a consequence of 
taking the priority of becoming over being seriously), especially in the "original 
state". It should be clear that we are here dealing with a weaker notion of 
individuation (but I do not think that this fact tells against its adequacy).36 In fact, 
one can point out that Zhuangzi's claim that "their [referring to individuated 
things] division is their completion, their completion is their destruction" (quoted 
from Perkins 2015b,66) is a perfect description of the fate of individuated entities 
in the "original state" as described by Smolin and Unger, for in that state the 
entities (now identified with their causal powers) are subject to individuation, but 
because there are no lawlike causal structures they are destroyed just as soon as 
they emerge (and then replaced with others). The point is that early Chinese 
metaphysics provides us with a philosophical vocabulary that is adequate for 
describing the "original state" (and that what may seem to be a metaphysical 
conundrum, when looked at from the perspective of Western metaphysics, is a 
perfectly acceptable state of affairs when looked at from the perspective of 
philosophical traditions that have historically emphasized becoming over being). 
It is important to note that having access to an adequate philosophical vocabulary 
to describe the thesis that one is advancing is not a trivial gain. First, it provides 
the conceptual tools for refining one's thesis. Second, it allows one to respond to 
the sorts of objections that are inevitably raised against any radical thesis that 
overturns the basic metaphysical presuppositions of the framework within which 
it is being discussed (i.e., the framework in relation to which it is ”radical”, for the 
term ‘radical is context dependent).37 These objections often take the form of 
claiming that the thesis in question is so incongruent with the philosophical 
 
35 According to Perkins "the use of wu in a discourse of individuation arose in the middle of the fourth 
century BC" (Perkins 2015b, 57). 
36 In fact, it is interesting to note that some Chinese thinkers, such as Guo Xiang, attempted to argue for 
the claim that each individual thing is its own kind, or has its own xing (Perkins 2015a).  
37 Using the term ‘radical’ as a synonym for ‘revolutionary’.   
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vocabulary that we are familiar with that it must be, in some sense, incoherent 
(or at the very least, highly implausible). Such preliminary objections can be 
overturned if one is able to point out that there are philosophical discourses that 
adopt (or have adopted) the presuppositions of this thesis as part of their basic 
metaphysical framework (this would be a kind of inference from the actual to the 
possible). Of course, this fact does not by itself establish the truth of the thesis in 
question, but it does give it a fighting chance by enabling us to graft it onto mature 
philosophical traditions (in this case, these are the traditions of early Chinese 
metaphysics).  
The upshot of evolutionary cosmology (or the hypothesis of cosmological 
natural selection) on the methodological level is that "cosmology must be a 
historical science if it is to be a science at all: a historical science first, a structural 
science only second, not the other way around" (Unger and Smolin 2015, xv). Of 
course this has wider implications, the fact that fields such as biology, history, 
sociology, anthropology and so on are not dealing with structures that do not 
change will not be held against them. On this view, the overarching metaphysical 
framework is the priority of becoming over being; hence all sciences will be 
historical in character. I think that the adoption of such a philosophical 
framework will have positive consequences in terms of ridding some of the 
practitioners of the human sciences of the illusion that dehistoricization is a 
necessary condition for rigour and intellectual seriousness. As Herbert Lüthy has 
perceptively noted: "at bottom, the disintegration of the human sciences stems 
from the illusion, pursued with a methodological obsessiveness, that it is possible 
to escape from the reality of the interpretation of consciousness within human 
history and from the decisions concerning values and power which characterize 
this history, into the ahistoricity of the mathematical formula" (quoted from 
Schmidt 1983, 1).38 It should be clear that what I am arguing against is not the 
adoption of mathematical formulations or mathematical models in the human 
sciences as such, what I am arguing against is the naïve belief that the 
construction of mathematical models is itself a sign of success, especially when 
such models are employed without a thorough and sincere examination of the 
 
38 We can also note in passing that one could argue that Leopold von Ranke established history as a science 
without mathematizing it (Beiser 2011, 253). 
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simplifying assumptions that have been made in order to arrive at the 
mathematical models in question.39 The end of science is reliable knowledge and 
not mathematical models as such; if mathematical models do not introduce 
excessive distortions that render them inadequate as representations of the 
phenomena which are the objects of study, then we should certainly employ 
them.40 However, if the use of mathematical models distorts the phenomena in 
question to an excessive degree, then we should not keep employing them just for 
the sake of appearing to be rigorous, for then we are not being scientific, we are 
merely engaging in empty posturing.41 I should also emphasize that I am not at 
all interested in employing this argument to replace one hierarchy with one 
another. For just as there is a superficial hierarchy that places the "purer" (i.e., 
the more mathematical) sciences at the top and the less "pure" (i.e., less 
mathematical) sciences at the bottom, there is also an equally superficial (and 
unhelpful) hierarchy that inverts the other one, placing the sciences that are 
perceived to be more complex (i.e., the human sciences) at the top and the other 
"less complex" sciences at the bottom. My view is that both hierarchies have no 
place in a sophisticated account of the relationship(s) between the different fields 
of human knowledge. In conclusion, I hope to have illustrated some of the 
interesting philosophical implications of the thesis (as originally advanced by C.S. 
Peirce) that the laws of nature evolve. I also hope to have shown how some of the 
problems that are associated with the contemporary version of this thesis (i.e., the 
thesis as it has been advanced by Smolin and Unger) can be avoided. In 
particular, I have argued that, contrary to what Smolin seems to think, the 
hypothesis of cosmological natural selection does not require the overthrow of 
the relativity of simultaneity as established by special relativity. In connection with 
the issue of the possibility of causal connections between different universes (and 
 
39 Anyone who has had the experience of applying mathematical models to accurately model physical 
phenomena knows that many simplifying assumptions are made when these models are constructed, and 
knows the importance of identifying the extent of the distortion that these assumptions produce (in some 
cases it is minimal, but in other cases it is intolerable and renders the model in question useless).  
40 I should note that this argument is neutral between instrumentalist and realist conceptions of the character 
of scientific knowledge.  
41 I should also note that this conflation of means and ends is prevalent in contemporary culture, and it 
would be naïve to think that academic discourse is completely shielded from the influences of contemporary 
culture.  
 ZEYAD SAMEH EL NABOLSY 21 
the threat that is posed to this possibility by the existence of singularities), I have 
pointed out that a Leibnizian conception of infinity allows us to reject the 
possibility of singularities without committing us to a blanket rejection of the 
possibility of there being an actual infinity of things in the universe (unlike Unger's 
less nuanced approach). I have also argued that the identity problem (which we 
can also describe as a problem of individuation) that arises from Smolin's and 
Unger's account of the "original state" can be mitigated if we draw upon the 
philosophical discourse of early Chinese metaphysics, with its emphasis on the 
priority of becoming over being and the ephemerality of individual entities (i.e., 
its use and development of a weak concept of individuation). Finally, I have 
argued that the thesis that the laws of nature evolve, with its overarching 
metaphysical framework of the priority of becoming over being, undercuts the 
prevalent and pernicious belief that fields of knowledge that deal with atemporal 
structures are in some sense more intellectually rigorous than fields that deal with 
completely historical (i.e., changing) phenomena that are difficult to model 
mathematically without excessive distortion. To be sure, the truth of the thesis 
that the laws of nature evolve cannot be established by philosophical reflection 
alone, but philosophical reflection can have a positive role to play in its 
formulation (and in examining the coherence of its philosophical presuppositions 
and implications). Moreover, philosophy itself can be enriched by reflection on 
cosmological theories and their implications. So perhaps instead of the two 
misleading hierarchies that have been used to characterize relationships between 
different fields of human knowledge, we ought to develop an account that 
emphasizes the fluidity and porosity of the boundaries between different fields, 
and, more importantly, we ought to develop an account that emphasizes the 
fecundity of interactions at the boundaries between different fields.42 
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42 From a historical point of view, there is nothing special about this claim (fruitful interactions between 
philosophical theories and what we would now describe as scientific theories and practices were the norm 
in early modern Europe). However, given the current hyper-specialized character of academia, it has 
become necessary to state this point explicitly.  
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